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Long-Term Health Care Insurance Challenges:
Meeting The Needs of an Aging Population
Angela S. Curran*
I. INTRODUCTION
America is graying. Approximately 21% of the American popu-
lation-51.4 million people-is 55 years of age or older.1 By the
turn of the century, there will be 10 million more elderly than in
1980,2 and they will live longer. Women at age sixty-five will have
a remaining life expectancy of twenty years; men the same age can
expect to live another sixteen years.3 The "old-old," individuals
over eighty years of age, is the fastest growing segment of the eld-
erly population. They currently comprise about 1.3% of the gen-
eral population (3.3 million people). By the beginning of the
twenty-first century, almost 5 million people will be at least eighty-
five years of age.5
Our aging population has many health needs that have not yet
been fully addressed by the public and private sectors. In fact,
nearly 90% of the disabled elderly who are not in nursing homes
receive unpaid assistance from relatives and friends.6 The now-re-
pealed Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 19887 was an at-
* B.A. 1981, Fordham University; J.D. 1984, Duke University.
1. SENATE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING, DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING: 1987 VOL.
3, S. REP. No. 100-291, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 5 (1988) [hereinafter DEVELOPMENTS
IN AGING]. The "elderly"-those 65 years of age or older-constitute 12% of the total
population (29.2 million people). As the "baby-boomers" age between 1985 and 2020,
the elderly population is expected to double. Id
2. Burke, Long-Term Care: The Public Role and Private Initiatives, in 1 HEALTH
CARE FIN. REV. 1 (Supp. 1988).
3. Id. (citing SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION: THE 1988 ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE
AND THE FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, H.R. Doc. No. 192, 100th
Cong. 2d Sess. (1988)).
4. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON LONG-TERM HEALTH CARE INSURANCE, WISCONSIN
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL STAFF, OVERVIEW OF LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE, at 4-5
(1986).
5. Id. at 5.
6. A. RIVLIN & J. WEINER, CARING FOR THE DISABLED ELDERLY: WHO WILL
PAY? 5 (1988).
7. Pub. L. No. 100-360, 102 Stat. 683 (1988), (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of Titles 18 and 19 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 & 1396 (1988);
repealed by Pub. L. No. 101-234, 103 Stat. 1979 (1989).
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tempt to expand the Medicare Program8 to shield Medicare
beneficiaries from the catastrophic costs associated with a short-
term, acute illness by, among other things, increasing coverage for
short-term stays in a certified skilled nursing facility,9 expanding
benefits for hospice care, I0 increasing benefits for home health serv-
ices," and providing new, but limited coverage for respite care.' 2
The Catastrophic Coverage Act, however, did not address growing
problem of financial costs associated with long-term chronic condi-
tions. 3 The major health problems of the elderly are no longer
associated with acute conditions. According to the Senate Special
Committee On Aging, arthritis, hypertension, Alzheimer's disease,
and other chronic conditions are now occurring with greater fre-
quency. '4 Approximately 80% of the elderly have at least one dis-
8. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395a-1395xx, (West 1983 and Supp. 1989).
9. A certified skilled nursing facility ("SNF") is defined as an institution primarily
engaged in providing to residents skilled nursing care and related rehabilitation services.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1395i-3(a) (West Supp. 1990). Effective January 1, 1989, the Catastrophic
Coverage Act would have extended Medicare Part A coverage for qualified stays in a
SNF from 100 days to 150 days per year, eliminated the requirement that a beneficiary
have a three-day hospital stay before becoming eligible for SNF benefits, and required the
beneficiary to pay coinsurance for only the first eight days of SNF care in an amount
equal to 20% of the nationwide average daily cost for SNF care. Pub. L. No 100-360,
§ 102, 102 Stat. 684-87 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395d) (West 1989)). That
amount was estimated to be $20.50 per day in 1989. Catastrophic-Costs Bill Is Sent to
White House, 46 CONG. Q. 1606 (1988).
10. The Act would have eliminated the 210-day limit for hospice care under Part A.
Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 101, 102 Stat. 684-85 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395d).
11. Effective January 1, 1990, the Act would have paid Medicare Part B benefits for
qualified home health care services seven days per week for up to 38 days if a physician
certified the need for such care on a daily basis. Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 206, 102 Stat.
731-32 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395x(m)).
12. Also effective January 1, 1990, benefits would have been paid under Medicare
Part B for up to eighty hours per year of paid care to give a respite to an unpaid family
member or friend who lives with, and cares for, a "chronically dependent" beneficiary.
Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 205, 102 Stat. 729-31 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395k(a)). A
"chronically dependent" beneficiary is one who lives with a voluntary care-giver whom a
physician certifies is dependent upon the care-giver for assistance with at least two activi-
ties of daily living (i.e. eating, bathing, dressing, toileting, moving in and out of bed).
Benefits include services for homemaking, personal care, and professional nursing care.
To be eligible for respite care benefits, however, the beneficiary must have surpassed the
Part B out-of-pocket limit ($1,370 in 1990) or the prescription drug deductible starting in
1991. Id.
13. The Act did not change the law excluding Medicare coverage for "custodial
care," that is, care that consists primarily of nonmedical assistance with activities of daily
living. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(a)(9). Approximately 90% of all nursing home residents
require custodial rather than skilled care. HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING, SUB-
COMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND LONG TERM CARE, 100TH CONG., IST SESS., NURSING
HOME INSURANCE: EXPLOITING FEAR FOR PROFIT? app. V at 100-634 (Comm. Print.
1987) [hereinafter NURSING HOME INSURANCE].
14. DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING, supra note 1, at 8-9.
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ability arising from a chronic health condition.'"
Although there is no generally accepted definition of "long-term
care," it is recognized as the type of care associated with chronic
illness. The term is used to describe a wide array of services, both
medical and nonmedical, in both institutional and noninstitutional
settings. The Health Care Financing Administration defines
"long-term care" as "the professional or personal services required
on a recurring or continuous basis by an individual because of
chronic or permanent physical or mental impairment. These serv-
ices may be provided in a variety of settings, including the client's
own home."' 6 Unlike acute care, the need for long-term care
should be determined by measuring disabilities that prevent the in-
dividual from carrying out normal day-to-day activities.' 7 Such ac-
tivities are divided into two categories: personal and
"environmental" or "support." In the first category, bathing,
dressing, getting in and out of bed, toileting, and eating commonly
are defined as "activities of daily living" ("ADLs"). In the second
category, tasks such as cooking, cleaning and shopping are defined
as "instrumental activities of daily living" ("IADLs"). 8
The financing of the long-term care needs of the elderly cur-
rently is the focus of debate at national and state levels, 9 in both
the public and private sectors.2 ° One alternative that has received
15. Id. at 8.
16. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE AGING POPULATION IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY: STATISTICS FOR HEALTH POLICY 137 (D. Gilford ed. 1988) [hereinaf-
ter THE AGING POPULATION].
17. See, e.g., Doty, Liu & Weiner, An Overview of Long-Term Care, 6 HEALTH CARE
FIN. REV. 69 (1985).
18. Scanlon, A Perspective On Long-Term Care for the Elderly, HEALTH CARE FIN.
REV. 7 (1988 Ann. Supp.). See also THE AGING POPULATION, supra note 16, at 138-39.
19. Historically, Medicare has not provided benefits for long-term care needs. The
Catastrophic Coverage Act propelled the debate over long-term care into the political
limelight, thus mobilizing the 101st Congress. The Act authorized $1.5 million to estab-
lish a bipartisan commission on comprehensive health care to make specific recommenda-
tions to Congress concerning long-term care for Medicare beneficiaries as well as
comprehensive health care for all citizens. The Act also authorized for the period cover-
ing 1989-93 $5 million annually for research on the delivery and financing of long-term
care services. Pub. L. No. 100-360, 102 Stat. 765-68 (1988). The 15-member commission
was called the U.S. BiPartisan Commission On Comprehensive Health Care, but popu-
larly was referred to as the "Pepper Commission" in honor of the late Claude Pepper
(Dem. Fla.) who was elected Chairman in February 1989. The Commission was added to
the legislation in an attempt to mollify Rep. Pepper, who had threatened to attach an
amendment establishing a federal program for home care services for the elderly. This
legislation is discussed infra at notes 236-78 and accompanying text. See generally New
'Pepper Commission' Has Rocky Beginning, 47 CONG. Q. 524-25 (1989); "Pepper Bill"
Pits Politics Against Process, 46 CONG. Q. 1491-93 (1988).
20. The elderly population is the largest potential voting block in the United States.
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much attention by those examining the issue of long-term care is
private, long-term care insurance. Such insurance was virtually
nonexistent prior to 1980, but the insurance industry now has ac-
cepted the need for long-term care as an insurable risk.21 As of
1986, approximately 200,000 policies insuring long-term care were
in force. 2 In a 1988 survey, the Health Insurance Association of
America reported 105 of its member companies selling long-term
care insurance in 1988. It further estimated that there are cur-
rently 1.1 million individual and group policies in effect.23 Ap-
proximate annual premiums for a person at age 65 range from
$300 to $700; premiums for those at age 79 range from $725 to
$1,500.24
Two recent market trends have the potential to reduce premi-
ums and further increase consumption. Employer-sponsored plans
are being offered with increasing frequency, even though the tax
consequences for employers and employees are not clear. 25 Alaska
See Backers of Long-Term Care Bill See End to Long Wait, Chicago Tribune, Mar. 13,
1989, § 1, at 4, col. 4. The pressure at both the federal and state levels to provide some
measure of insurance for long-term care costs often is attributed to the vocal lobbying
efforts of groups representing senior citizens, for example, the Gray Panthers, the Ameri-
can Association of Retired Persons ("AARP"), and the Villers Foundation. See, ag.,
Long-Term Care '88: Campaign for an Issue, 46 CONG. Q. 939 (1988).
21. Fireman's Fund American Life Insurance Company (now AMEX Life Assurance
Company) and United Equitable Life Insurance Company started underwriting policies
covering nursing home costs in the late 1970s. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSUR-
ANCE COMMISSIONERS, LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE: AN INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE
ON MARKET DEVELOPMENT AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 7-8 (1986) [hereinafter
NAIC REPORT]; Meiners, The State of the Art in Long-Term Care Insurance, NATIONAL
CENTER FOR HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH (April 9, 1984).
22. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE: COVER-
AGE VARIES WIDELY IN A DEVELOPING MARKET, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUB-
COMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND LONG-TERM CARE, HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
AGING 16 (May 1987) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
23. HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, RESEARCH BULLETIN, LONG-
TERM CARE INSURANCE: MARKET TRENDS 5 (March 1989) [hereinafter HIAA RE-
SEARCH BULLETIN].
24. A. RIVLIN & J. WEINER, supra note 6, at 60.
25. HIAA RESEARCH BULLETIN, supra note 23, at 17-21. The 101st Congress intro-
duced proposals to amend the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (1985 & Supp. 1990), to permit employer contributions for long-
term care health plans with favorable tax consequences for employer and employee. H.R.
1865, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 138, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). It is beyond the
scope of this Article to evaluate these proposed changes. It should be noted, however,
that such changes have been recommended to facilitate the increased use of private, long-
term care insurance and concomitant decrease in premiums. See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON
LONG-TERM HEALTH CARE POLICIES, HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION,
FACT SHEET ON LONG-TERM CARE (1987), reprinted in TASK FORCE ON LONG-TERM
HEALTH CARE POLICIES, REPORT TO CONGRESS AND THE SECRETARY 41-53 and app.
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has sponsored a plan for state employees since 1987,26 and Con-
gress has considered several bills providing a long-term care plan
for federal civil employees.2 7 Employer-sponsored group plans are
attractive because premiums are lower and more affordable at
younger ages. Moreover, although individual insurers often rely
upon medical underwriting criteria to determine eligibility for ben-
efits, group long-term care policies determine the need for care by
assessing inability to perform ADLs.28 This method of evaluation
more closely follows the definition of "long-term care."
Several insurance companies also are offering optional long-term
care riders to universal life insurance policies.29 Under these plans,
death benefits are prepaid (usually at the rate of 2% per month) if
the insured becomes eligible for coverage under the long-term care
rider.30 These products are considered to be one of the most prom-
ising innovations of the private, long-term care insurance market.
The premium for the rider typically is lower than a free-standing
long-term care insurance product, and the policy generally pro-
vides a greater return on investment.3 a
The following discussion is limited to freestanding indemnity
policies that insure long-term care. There are, however, other
models of long-term care insurance. Long-term care benefits can
be offered through a health maintenance organization or similarly
managed-care environment. 32 Social Health Maintenance Organi-
zations ("S/HMOs") integrate a broad array of chronic care bene-
fits with acute care benefits in a managed-care environment, but S/
HMOs are available only in four cities. 3  Continuing care retire-
ment communities ("CCRCs") provide sheltered housing and a
at 135-46 [hereinafter LONG-TERM HEALTH CARE TASK FORCE REPORT]; NAIC RE-
PORT, supra note 21, at 38-40.
26. HIAA RESEARCH BULLETIN, supra note 23, at 17-21.
27. H.R. 212, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 38, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
28. HIAA RESEARCH BULLETIN, supra note 23, at 17-21.
29. Id. at 22. First Penn Pacific Life Insurance Company and ITT Life Insurance
Company currently offer such policies in Illinois. Telephone interview with Mark
Fulginza, Evaluation Unit, Illinois Department of Insurance (Apr. 26, 1989).
30. HIAA RESEARCH BULLETIN, supra note 23, at 22.
31. Id.
32. As of April 1989, only one HMO, Group Health of Puget Sound in Washington,
has offered such benefits to its enrollees. Id. at 23.
33. See generally, A. RIVLIN & J. WEINER, supra note 6, ch. 6; LEUTZ, CHANGING
HEALTH CARE FOR AN AGING SOCIETY: PLANNING FOR THE SOCIAL HEALTH MAIN-
TENANCE ORGANIZATION (1985). Congress mandated a S/HMO demonstration project
as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984. There currently are only four demonstra-
tion plans in Brooklyn, New York; Portland, Oregon; Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Long
Beach, California. A. RIVLIN & J. WEINER, supra note 6, at 97-98.
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continuum of care services. 34 Depending upon an elderly client's
financial resources and personal preferences, CCRCs or managed-
care programs provide an alternative to indemnity long-term care
insurance.
II. SOURCES OF PUBLIC FINANCING OF LONG-TERM CARE
Advice about long-term care insurance should not be offered in a
vacuum. Rather, the consumer must evaluate relative costs and
benefits of private insurance in light of the current public financing
available for long-term care. The following section provides a brief
overview of federal financing programs.
A. Background Information
The poverty rate among the elderly has declined from 28.5% in
1966 to 12.8% in 1986. 35 Their average median income in 1986,
however, was only $19,992.36 Elderly persons, in particular those
over 85 years of age, are more likely to be just above the poverty
line than their younger counterparts." Poverty rates also remain
high for elderly women, and the elderly who live alone.38
Given these statistics, it is not surprising that the health care
expenditures for the elderly far outpace their incomes. In 1984
(the last year for which separate figures for the elderly are avail-
able), projected total health care expenditures for the elderly were
$119.9 billion (or $4,202 per elderly person). 39 Twenty-one percent
of these health care expenditures (approximately $25 billion) were
for nursing home care/ ° In 1987, nursing home expenditures for
all ages totalled $41.6 billion. 1 By the year 2000, nursing home
34. See generally, A. RIVLIN & J. WEINER, supra note 6, ch. 5; Cohen, Life Care:
New Options for Financing and Delivering Long-Term Care, 9 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV.
139 (1988 Ann. Supp.). Aetna Life & Casualty and Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany currently provides coverage to CCRC members.
35. DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING, supra note 1, at 28. However, there is such a wide
diversity among the elderly's income that these figures are misleading. Id. at 28-29.
36. Id. at 28.
37. Id. at 28-29.
38. LONG-TERM HEALTH CARE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 25, app. at 66.
One-third (9 million) of the elderly population live alone. CHAIRMAN OF HOUSE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON AGING, AGING NOTES: AN INFORMATION BRIEF, H.R. REP. No. 100-
668, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. at 7 (1988) [hereinafter cited as AGING NOTES].
39. Waldo & Lazenby, Demographic Characteristics and Health Care Use and Ex-
penditures By the Aged in the United States: 1977-1984, 6 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 1, 8,
10 (Fall 1984); THE AGING POPULATION, supra note 16, at 156.
40. Waldo & Lazenby, supra note 39, at 8; THE AGING POPULATION, supra note 16,
at 157.
41. DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING, supra note 1, at 30. People under age 65 represent
1080 [Vol. 21
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expenditures are expected to triple to $129 billion.4 2 Long-term
care is expensive. In 1988, the average national nursing home cost
per person per year was estimated to be $25,000.41 As can be ex-
pected, costs are much higher in urban areas such as Washington
D.C., where annual nursing home costs ranged from $36,000 to
$48,000 in 1988."1 Medicare reimbursement rates for home health
care averaged $63.11 per day in 1988. 4-
Not only is cost a major problem for the elderly, but they face a
significant risk of incurring these extraordinary expenses for long-
term care as well. Approximately 1.3 million elderly-5% of the
elderly population-were admitted to nursing homes in 1985. 46
The U.S. Administration On Aging 47 expects the elderly nursing
home population to reach 2 million by the turn of the century and
4.6 million by 2040.48 Those over 85 constitute almost half of the
elderly nursing home population,49 with women comprising 75%
of nursing home residents.5 0 Elderly persons between the ages of
65 and 69 face a 5% risk of entering a nursing home within five
years, and a 43% risk of entering a nursing home during their re-
maining lifetimes.5 Most (75%) nursing home residents stay in
the home for less than one year, and less than one-half of residents
stay in the home fewer than three months.5 2 The average length of
stay in a nursing home, however, is 456 days53 because "long-stay-
ers," patients who spend more than one year in a nursing home,
account for over 91% of all nursing home admissions.5 4
11. 3% of all nursing home admissions (approximately 146,000 admissions per year).
LONG-TERM HEALTH CARE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 25, app. at 84-91.
42. DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING, supra note 1, at 31.
43. Id. at 27.
44. G. SHEARER, LONG-TERM CARE: ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC POLICY OPTIONS 12
(1988).
45. Id.
46. DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING, supra note 1, at 12.
47. The Commission is the principal agency for carrying out legislative programs
created for the elderly. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 3011 et seq. (1988).
48. DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING, supra note 1, at 12. Nursing home occupancy rates
averaged 92% in 1985. A. RIVLIN & J. WEINER, supra note 6, at 8.
49. DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING, supra note 1, at 12, 14. The median age of nursing
home residents is 81 years. LONG-TERM HEALTH CARE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 25, app. at 67.
50. DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING, supra note 1, at 14.
51. CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING, LONG-TERM CARE
AND PERSONAL IMPOVERISHMENT: SEVEN IN TEN ELDERLY LIVING ALONE ARE AT
RISK, H.R. Doc. No. 110-631, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1987) [hereinafter LONG-TERM
CARE AND PERSONAL IMPOVERISHMENT).
52. DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING, supra note 1, at 12.
53. LONG-TERM HEALTH CARE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 25, app. at 67.
54. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 27.
1990] 1081
Loyola University Law Journal
B. Government Programs that Finance Long-Term Care
1. Nursing Home Expenditures
The 1984 health care expenditures of the elderly ($119 billion)
were financed as follows:
25.% Out-of-pocket
7.2% Private insurance
48.8% Medicare
12.8% Medicaid
5.6% Other government programs55
The nursing home expenditures of the elderly for the same year
($25 billion), however, were financed largely by out-of-pocket pay-
ments and Medicaid:
50.1% Out-of-pocket
1.1% Private insurance
2.1% Medicare
41.5% Medicaid
4.4% Other government programs5 6
Medicaid 7 is the principal source of public funding for long-
term care. It has become the primary source of government fund-
ing for long-term care because the needy elderly can turn to it
when they have drained their own assets. Under the federal-state
matching program, approximately 32 states provide medical assist-
ance to medically needy elderly who meet state-prescribed income
levels.5 If the elderly person's income is above the prescribed in-
come level, he or she can become eligible for Medicaid benefits by
"spending-down" to the poverty level.5 9
Forty-eight percent of all nursing home residents are Medicaid
recipients, 60 but many were not Medicaid-eligible when they en-
tered the nursing home. Rather, almost one-half of the persons
entering nursing homes as private payors became eligible to receive
Medicaid benefits after entering the nursing home. 61 A recent
55. THE AGING POPULATION, supra note 16, at 156-57.
56. DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING, supra note 1, at 30.
57. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396 et seq. (West 1983 & Supp. 1989).
58. Id. at 35-36. In states that do not have medically needy programs, there is an
option that extends coverage of nursing home benefits to persons with incomes up to
300% of the basic federal Supplemental Social Security Income level. For a more exten-
sive discussion of Medicaid spend-down requirements, see generally DEVELOPMENTS IN
AGING, supra note 1, at 35-36, 38-40.
59. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a.
60. DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING, supra note 1, at 35.
61. LONG-TERM HEALTH CARE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 25, at 19.
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study by the House Select Committee On Aging estimates that af-
ter only thirteen weeks in a nursing home, seven of ten elderly per-
sons living alone reduce their income to the federal poverty level.62
The Committee's finding for married couples also is staggering:
within six months after one spouse enters a nursing home, approxi-
mately 50% of elderly couples will spend down their income to
poverty level.63
Medicaid was not intended to be a long-term care insurance pro-
gram even though, in 1987, it paid $13.3 billion for nursing home
care for its beneficiaries. 64 The Medicare program cannot be con-
sidered a source of funds for nursing home expenditures because it
was not designed to reimburse beneficiaries for these costs. Indeed,
Medicare pays only 2% of the national expenditures for elderly
nursing home care ($607 million in 1986).65 The average Medicare
reimbursement for care in an SNF in 1986 was for twenty-seven
days, although the statute provided coverage for up to one hundred
days.66 The elderly, therefore, must be aware of other options.
2. Home Care
Home-based, long-term care services allow individuals to avoid
unneeded institutionalization and to maintain their independence
in the community.67 Services range from medical and therapeutic
services to assistance with activities of daily living. 68 Home health
62. LONG-TERM CARE AND PERSONAL IMPOVERISHMENT, supra note 51, at 6.
Within one year of entering a nursing home, two-thirds of elderly living alone deplete
their income and assets. Id.
63. Id. at 8. Similarly, one-half of elderly couples will deplete income and assets after
one spouse is in a nursing home for one year. Id. The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage
Act included amendments to curb the incidence of spousal impoverishment after one
spouse enters a nursing home. See Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 303, 102 Stat. 754-64 (1988),
42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-5 (West Supp. 1989). The amendments contained the following pro-
visions. In any period of continuous institutionalization of a person, the couple's total
assets are to be counted and divided equally, with half considered to be available for each
spouse. The home, household goods, and personal effects are excluded. If the at-home
spouse is left with less than $12,000 after the division of assets, the institutionalized
spouse may transfer an amount sufficient to raise the at-home spouse's assets to $12,000.
Also, effective September 30, 1989, states must permit the at-home spouse to keep a main-
tenance allowance from the institutionalized spouses's income in an amount sufficient to
bring the at-home spouse's total monthly income to 122% of the federal poverty level for
a two-person household ($786 in 1988), but not to exceed $1,500 per month. The permit-
ted level of assets and monthly maintenance allowance will be indexed for inflation.
64. DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING, supra note 1, at 30.
65. See id. at 28.
66. Id. at 34. Medicare denied approximately 31.8% of all SNF claims in 1986. Id.
at 35.
67. Id. at 41.
68. Id.
1990] 1083
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benefits that may be reimbursed under Medicaid include part-time
nursing, home health aides, and medical equipment and supplies. 9
Under the "2176 Waiver" program (named after the section of the
Act creating the program), Medicaid requirements can be waived
to permit states to provide a broader range of home-based and
community-based services to recipients who would otherwise re-
sort to Medicaid-financed care in a skilled nursing facility or inter-
mediate care facility, provided the alternative services cost no more
than the institutional care.70 The services allowed under the
waiver include long-term nursing or therapy for chronic condi-
tions, case management, personal care, homemaker and chore serv-
ices, adult day health care, and respite care.7 1 As of 1987, forty-six
states had 180 approved waiver programs in operation.72
Like nursing home care, home care services can deplete an eld-
erly person's assets in a short period of time. Using an estimated
daily cost of $43 per home care visit, the House Select Committee
On Aging determined that almost 80% of the elderly living alone
and 33% of elderly couples would fall to the poverty level after one
year of home care services provided five days per week.73 Medicare
does provide some reimbursement for home health services, but the
emphasis is on acute care, not chronic care. To receive home
health benefits, a beneficiary must be under the care of a physician,
confined to the home, and in need of skilled nursing care, physical
therapy, speech therapy, medical social services, a home health
aide, medical supplies or durable medical equipment. 4 Home
health benefits are one of the fastest growing portions of the Medi-
care budget, but still they comprise only 3.8% of total program
outlays.75
3. Community-based Services
Both the Social Services Block Grants76 and the Older Ameri-
69. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396a, 1396n (West 1983 and Supp. 1989).
70. Id. § 1396n(b).
71. Id. For a more extensive discussion of home and community services under
Medicaid, see generally R. PIERCE, LONG-TERM CARE FOR THE ELDERLY: A LEGISLA-
TOR'S GUIDE ch. 4 (1987).
72. DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING, supra note 1, at 45. Five states, including Florida,
California, Illinois, New York, and Oregon, account for 56% of all aged and disabled
waiver recipients. Id.
73. LONG-TERM CARE AND PERSONAL IMPOVERISHMENT, supra note 51, at 8.
74. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395x(m) (West 1983 and Supp. 1989).
75. DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING, supra note 1, at 43. For 1987, Medicare outlays for
home health care were $2.5 billion. Id.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1397 et seq. (1988).
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cans Act" are designed to prevent inappropriate institutionaliza-
tion by providing community-based services such as
transportation, nutrition, and personal and legal services. Funding
is provided by grants to the States.
III. LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE
Advising the elderly that current federal programs provide only
limited financing of their long-term care needs is the first step in
developing a financing plan for their long-term care. A 1985 sur-
vey conducted by the American Association of Retired Persons
("AARP") revealed that 79% of its members believed that Medi-
care would pay for all or part of their extended nursing home
care.78 In addition, many elderly have Medicare supplemental in-
surance policies, commonly known as "Medigap" policies, which
are designed primarily to pay coinsurance and deductibles required
under Medicare. 79 In the 1985 AARP survey, 35% of the mem-
bers with Medigap coverage believed that their policies included
coverage for extended nursing home care, although most of these
policies do not.s0 Publications by the federal government, such as
the "Guide to Health Insurance For People With Medicare,"
should be used to educate clients about the limited coverage for
custodial care and other long-term care under Medicare and Medi-
gap policies."1 Elderly clients should be informed that, unlike
Medigap policies, long-term care insurance is not designed to fill
77. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3001 et seq. (West 1983 and Supp. 1989). For a more detailed
discussion of these programs, see generally DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING, supra note 1, at
46-47; R. PIERCE, supra note 71, ch. 4.
78. American Association of Retired Persons, Preferences of AARP Members for
Specific Long-Term Care Insurance Product Features (unpublished survey conducted by
Towers, Perrin, Forster and Crosby, Washington D.C., 1985) [hereinafter AARP
Survey].
79. Approximately 65% of the noninstitutionalized elderly have purchased private
Medigap policies. THE AGING POPULATION, supra note 16, at 156.
80. AARP Survey, supra note 78. Unlike long-term care insurance, Medigap policies
are regulated by federal law. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ss (West 1983 and Supp. 1989). The
regulations were a direct response to the actual and perceived abuses in the sales and
marketing of such policies. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT
TO CONGRESS: STUDY OF HEALTH INSURANCE DESIGNED TO SUPPLEMENT MEDICARE
AND OTHER LIMITED BENEFIT HEALTH INSURANCE SOLD TO MEDICARE BENEFI-
CIARIES (Washington, D.C. 1987) [hereinafter HHS REPORT TO CONGRESS]. Among
other things, the "Baucus Amendment," as the law is commonly known, prohibits the
intentional sale of policies that duplicate Medicare covered services. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1395ss(d)(3) (West 1983).
81. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH CARE FINANCING
ADMINISTRATION, GUIDE TO HEALTH INSURANCE FOR PEOPLE WITH MEDICARE
(Government Printing Office 1986).
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the gaps in Medicare coverage. Rather, it is designed to provide
coverage for the long-term care costs described in the beginning of
this Article.
A. Evolution of the Product
Insurers developed long-term care insurance to avoid two com-
mon underwriting problems: "adverse selection" and "induced de-
mand" (or "moral hazard").,2 Adverse selection describes the risk
that only those persons who have a greater chance of needing long-
term care will purchase insurance, thereby increasing the average
use of insurance and raising premiums.8 3 Policy features such as
exclusions for certain conditions, delayed coverage for preexisting
conditions, limitations on renewal, reliance on medical underwrit-
ing, and age limits are used by long-term care insurers to reduce
the risk of adverse selection."4 Induced demand refers to the in-
surer's risk that the presence of insurance will encourage use of
covered services when the insured may not have used such services
in the absence of insurance.8 5 To avoid induced demand, long-
term care insurers initially designed policies with long waiting peri-
ods, required prior hospitalization for eligibility for benefits, and
provided fewer benefits for noninstitutional or lower level care
when it was perceived that induced demand would be greatest. 6
Periodically since 1984, there have been several surveys of long-
term care insurance policies that have evaluated specific insurance
products and demonstrated their weaknesses."7 There are at least
105 companies currently offering long-term care policies. Many of
these companies offer the consumer options that, alone and in com-
82. See generally LONG-TERM HEALTH CARE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 25,
at 59-61, app. at 167. A. RIVLIN & J. WEINER, supra note 6, at 65-68.
83. A. RIVLIN & J. WEINER, supra note 6, at 66.
84. See LONG-TERM HEALTH CARE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 25, at 59-61,
app. at 167; A. RIVLIN & J. WEINER, supra note 6, at 65-68.
85. Id. On the one hand, the risk of induced demand appears to be great with long-
term care insurance. Statistics show that informal caregiving by family and friends ac-
counts for over 70% of all assistance received by disabled and chronically ill elderly. On
the other hand, however, there is no evidence that families are less willing to provide
caregiving services because of private insurance. Moreover, people generally prefer not to
enter nursing homes for as long as possible. LONG-TERM HEALTH CARE TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 25, at 59; see also A. RIVLIN & J. WEINER, supra note 6, at 5.
86. See LONG-TERM HEALTH CARE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 25, at 59-61,
app. at 167. A. RIVLIN & J. WEINER, supra note 6, at 65-68.
87. See J. FIRMAN, W. WEISSERT & P. WILSON, PRIVATE LONG-TERM CARE IN-
SURANCE: How WELL IS IT MEETING CONSUMER NEEDS AND PUBLIC POLICY CON-
CERNS? (United Seniors Health Bulletin, Sept. 1988); GAO REPORT, supra note 22, ch. 2;
Who Can Afford A Nursing Home?, CONSUMER REP., 300 (May 1988); Bingham, Plan-
ning for the Elderly: Long-Term Care Insurance, PROB. AND PROP. 12 (1989).
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bination, may affect the level of coverage, the chance of receiving
benefits, and premium rates. Moreover, despite recent findings in-
dicating that the market has become more consumer-oriented as a
result of state regulation,8 many policies have not been upgraded
to reflect state-of-the-art features nor the minimum legislative stan-
dards. Specific policy features will be evaluated in the correspond-
ing discussion of applicable regulatory standards.
B. Evolution of Uniform Standards
Prior to 1986, there were no uniform standards for long-term
care insurance. In 1986, however, the National Association of In-
surance Commissioners ("NAIC") published the Long-Term Care
Insurance Model Act (the "Model Act") and Long-Term Care In-
surance Model Regulations (the "Model Regulations"). The
NAIC Model Act and NAIC Model Regulations, most recently
amended in January 1990, define a new class of insurance, set forth
its purpose, and specify disclosure, format, and minimum perform-
ance standards that apply predominantly to group and individual
long-term care insurance policies.8 9 The NAIC Model Act and
Model Regulations also recognize the need for different require-
ments for group policies under certain circumstances, such as ex-
clusions for preexisting conditions and conversion of policies for
former employees. As of January 1990, 28 states adopted the
NAIC Model Act with some variation.90 Several states have en-
acted legislation concerning long-term care insurance that is more
88. See HIAA RESEARCH BULLETIN, supra note 23, Summary.
89. Unless otherwise noted, all references are to the Model Act and Model Regula-
tions, NAIC MODEL INSURANCE LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND GUIDELINES, vol. III
(1984), amended as of January 1990 [hereinafter NAIC MODEL ACT].
90. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1691 et seq. (1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18,
§ 7101 et seq. (1989); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 431:10-521 et seq. (Supp. 1989); IDAHO
CODE § 41-4601 etseq. (1988); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 963A-1 etseq. (Supp. 1989)
(the Illinois Department of Insurance has not yet adopted the Model Regulations); IND.
CODE ANN. § 12-125-1 et seq. (West Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. § 514G.1 et seq.
(West 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2225 et seq. (1988); MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A,
§ 642 et seq. (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-4501 et seq. (1987); NEV. ADMIN. CODE
§ 33-15A-1 et seq. (1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 415-D:1 et seq. (1990); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 59A-23A-1 et seq. (1989); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-540 et seq. (1987); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 26.1-45-01 (1987); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3923.41 et seq. (Baldwin 1988);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 4421 et seq. (1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-34.2-1 et seq.
(1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-72-60 (Law Co-op. 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§§ 58-17B-1 to 58-17B15 (Supp. 1989); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-42-101 to 56-42-106
(Supp. 1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 8051 etseq. (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5200et
seq. (1987); W. VA. CODE § 33-15A-1 et seq. (1989); Wyo. STAT. 26-38-101 et seq.
(Supp. 1988).
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stringent than the NAIC Model Act in some respect9 or takes a
different regulatory approach. 92 Other states have made efforts to
increase the consumption of private, long-term care insurance.
Recent state and federal legislative activity concerning long-term
care insurance is attributable to two objectives: providing incen-
tive for insurers to enter a market in which they had little or no
experience in underwriting the risk, and providing sufficient con-
sumer protection to prevent the same type of abuses in sales and
marketing of long-term care insurance that occurred with Medigap
policies in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 93 Indeed, the "purposes"
provision of the NAIC Model Act includes these two objectives.94
These objectives, however, often conflict, resulting in unfortunate
lack of clarity in the legislation.
Two competing strategies exist for regulating the mechanics of
long-term care insurance policies. The less restrictive approach
adopted by the NAIC is to set minimum standards of coverage and
to permit insurers broad discretion in establishing levels and limits
of coverage, as long as the coverage adequately is defined in the
policy. 95 Insurers, however, may do only what is minimally re-
quired to comply with such performance standards, unless the
market simply will not tolerate such minimal performance. The
more restrictive approach is "standardization," in which the regu-
lation mandates the level and limits of coverage.96 Several states
have chosen the latter approach, although insurers allege that it
discourages them from entering the market.97
C. Compliance with Legislative Performance Standards
Evaluating long-term care insurance policies to determine com-
pliance with legislative performance standards is not a simple task.
91. CAL. INS. CODE § 10230 et seq. (West Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-174x (West 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.9401 et seq. (West Supp. 1989); GA.
CODE ANN. § 33-42-1 et seq. (1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24A, § 5051 et seq.
(Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62A.46 et seq. (West 1986 and Supp. 1988); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 48.84.010 et seq. (Supp. 1988); Wis. ADMIN. CODE § Ins. 3.46
(1986).
92. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-19 to 101 etseq. (1987 and Supp. 1988); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 304.17-314 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); N.Y. INS. LAW § 1117 (McKin-
ney 1986); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 370-1(f)(5) (Vernon 1987).
93. The sales and marketing abuses that occurred with Medigap policies have re-
ceived more publicity than similar abuses in sales and marketing of long-term care insur-
ance. See infra notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
94. NAIC MODEL ACT § 1.
95. LONG-TERM HEALTH CARE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 25, at 34.
96. Id. See also, G. SHEARER, supra note 44, at 32.
97. NAIC REPORT, supra note 21, at 28-29.
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Many of these standards specifically are designed to permit insur-
ers freedom to experiment. The NAIC Model Act, for example,
expressly states that one of its purposes is to "facilitate flexibility
and innovation in the development of long-term care insurance
coverage.'98 The standards set forth in the NAIC Model Act often
are vague, particularly in their combined effect. In addition, many
companies offer a menu of options that are confusing even for the
educated consumer, and an ill-advised combination of options
often can have adverse consequences on the overall policy cover-
age. Accordingly, evaluating these policies involves application of
basic legal principles governing the construction and interpretation
of insurance policies. First, as recognized in the NAIC Model Act,
a long-term care insurance policy must meet the purchaser's rea-
sonable expectations of coverage. 99 Risk-shifting from insured to
insurer is an essential element of any contract of insurance.10°
In Illinois, as in other jurisdictions, the primary objective of in-
terpreting an insurance contract is giving effect to the intent of the
parties."°" When a provision in an insurance policy is subject to
more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous and must
be construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured. 10 2
Ambiguous provisions in which an insurer limits its liability are
construed most strongly against the insurer. 103 Thus, exclusionary
provisions operate to limit or deny coverage only when they are
clear, definite, and explicit." Illinois, moreover, extends the prin-
ciple of an implied contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing
to the interpretation of insurance policies. 0 5
D. The NAIC Model Approach
The NAIC Model Act contains two types of regulation. The
first is "performance standards," which control the mechanics of
the insurance instrument, including standards of coverage, rules
regarding renewability, and limitations or exclusions of coverage.
98. NAIC MODEL ACT § 1.
99. NAIC MODEL AT Draft Note to § 4.
100. See generally 12 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE, §§ 7001, 7004
(1981).
101. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 769 F.2d 425, 427-8
(7th Cir. 1985) (applying Illinois law); Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. Kubik, 142 Ill.
App. 3d 906, 909, 492 N.E.2d 504, 506 (1st Dist. 1986).
102. 12 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 100, §§ 7001, 7004.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1972) (applying Illi-
nois law).
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The second type of regulation contains standards controlling the
structure, presentation, and distribution of the policy, such as dis-
closure statements, "free-look" provisions, and the size of the
print. Performance requirements strongly affect the insurer's un-
derwriting and the premium rates; structural regulations do not."
Therefore, structural requirements do not increase the costs for the
insurer to as great a degree as stringent mechanical requirements.
Both types of regulation will be discussed below.
1. Performance Standards
a. Definitions
Policies that are marketed or offered as "long-term care insur-
ance" or "nursing home insurance" must meet the requirements of
the Model Act.107 The Illinois law contains essentially the same
provision. 108 The NAIC Model Act defines "long-term care insur-
ance" as follows:
any insurance policy or rider advertised, marketed, offered or
designed to provide coverage for not less than twelve (12) consec-
utive months for each covered person on an expense incurred,
indemnity, prepaid or other basis; for one or more necessary or
medically necessary diagnostic, preventive, therapeutic, rehabili-
tative, maintenance or personal care services, provided in a set-
ting other than an acute care unit of a hospital .... Long-term
care insurance may be issued by insurers, fraternal benefit socie-
ties, nonprofit health, hospital and medical service corporations,
prepaid health plans; [a]nd health maintenance organizations or
any similar organization .... .o
The Model Act specifically excludes any insurance policy that is
offered primarily to provide basic Medicare supplement coverage,
or specified disease coverage, among others.110 Laws and regula-
tions concerning Medicare supplement insurance are made ex-
pressly inapplicable to long-term care insurance.'
106. LONG-TERM HEALTH CARE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 25, at 34.
107. NAIC MODEL ACT § 2. The Model Act, however, does not provide a definition
of a "nursing home policy" nor are such policies mentioned in any other provision of the
Act. The Maine statute defines a "nursing home care policy" as a policy in which 50%
or more of the benefits payable are related to nursing home confinement. ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 5051(3) (Supp. 1988). Such a distinction between a long-term
care policy and a nursing home policy has the effect of alerting the consumer that the
policy provides only limited benefits.
108. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73 para. 963A-I (Supp. 1989). Unless otherwise noted, the
Illinois legislation incorporates all provisions of the NAIC MODEL ACT.
109. NAIC MODEL ACT § 4.
110. Id.
111. Id. § 2. The Model Act applies to life-care riders to life insurance policies. The
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Even this definition sets a minimum standard of twelve months
for the duration of benefits. By permitting long-term care insur-
ance to provide benefits for only twelve consecutive months, the
Model Act promotes policies that offer the consumer very little
actual benefit in light of the risk of institutionalization. In 1983,
non-Medicare patients admitted to nursing homes for chronic care
had a mean length of stay of 419.7 days. 12 One private study esti-
mates that the "long-stayers"- residents who stay in a nursing
home for more than one year- account for 91% of nursing home
admissions." 3 If an insurer can offer a product that does not meet
reasonable expectations for long-term coverage, in this case in ex-
cess of one year, then this regulation does not provide adequate
consumer protection. However, according to a survey of twenty-
nine long-term care policies offered by its members, the median
maximum benefit period for nursing home care was four years, and
the median maximum coverage period for home health care was
two years. " 4
Moreover, the Model Act's definition of long-term care insur-
ance is vague because it does not specify whether the policy must
offer the minimum period of coverage for all levels of care. The
Model Act prohibits long-term care insurance policies from pro-
viding coverage for skilled nursing care only or providing "signifi-
cantly more coverage for skilled care in a facility than coverage for
lower levels of care. "I5 But it remains unclear from these two pro-
visions whether all levels of care must be covered for the minimum
period of twelve consecutive months. If the intention of the law is
to require equal minimum benefits for all levels of care, then the
definitional section should be amended expressly to require mini-
mum coverage of twelve consecutive months regardless of the level
of care or type of facility." 6
Another weakness in the definition of long-term care insurance
policies is the exclusion of insurance policies that are marketed pri-
marily as, for example, Medigap, disability or health policies, but
offer long-term care benefits. It would not be necessary for such
NAIC Comment to Section 1 of the Model Act recognizes that this product raises regula-
tory concerns that are not yet addressed in the Model Act, but such regulations are forth-
coming. NAIC MODEL ACT Comment to § 1.
112. HHS REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 80, at 122.
113. Keeler, Short and Long-Term Residents of Nursing Homes, 19 MED. CARE 363-
69 (1981).
114. HIAA RESEARCH BULLETIN, supra note 23, at 10-11.
115. NAIC MODEL ACT § 6(B)(3).
116. A federal proposal included this clause. See infra notes 242-43 and accompany-
ing text.
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policies to meet the minimum standards of the Model Act. A pro-
posed amendment to the Model Act would have corrected this gap
specifically by including all such insurance policies that contain a
long-term care benefit of at least six months in the definition of
long-term care insurance. 17
The NAIC Model Act applies as well to "group long-term care
insurance."' 18 Among other things, the Act provides that such in-
surance can be offered only by a legitimate association (e.g., profes-
sional, trade, or occupation association) and only if it is maintained
in good faith for purposes other than obtaining insurance.1 9 The
State Commissioner of Insurance is authorized to permit a
"group" not meeting the requirements of the Model Act to offer
long-term care insurance if issuance of a group policy comports
with public policy.1 20 However, a group policy issued in another
state by such a group may not be offered in the home state unless
the sister state has a similar regulatory program and has made a
determination that the group policy is in the public interest. 12
b. Cancellation/renewal
The NAIC describes four types of renewability provisions, all of
which have been used in long-term care policies. "Optionally re-
newable" provisions leave renewal at the sole option of the insurer.
"Conditionally renewable" provisions permit the insurer to refuse
renewal by class or geographic area. The insurer may also decline
117. NAIC Memorandum of Carol Olson, Senior Attorney, Long-Term Care Insur-
ance Model Act and Regulations Proposed Amendments (available from the NAIC)
(March 22, 1989).
118. NAIC MODEL AcT § 4(E).
119. Id. § 4(E)(2)(3). Although not specifically expressed in the DRAFT NOTES OF
THE NAIC MODEL ACT, this regulation apparently is intended to prevent exemptions of
group policies offered by sham senior citizen groups, such as one that operated in Minne-
sota in 1984-86. In that case, MediCo Life Insurance Company agents sold over 4,000
policies to senior citizens in the state, first soliciting them to purchase the policy and then
informing them that they were required to join a senior citizen federation to purchase the
insurance. The policies sold paid custodial benefits of less than $2 per day. The federa-
tion was exempt from the minimum benefits provision then in effect in Minnesota, and
from disclosure requirements; most insureds believed that they had received better bene-
fits. The Minnesota Department of Insurance investigated from 1984 to 1986 and was
prepared to file a formal action for unfair and deceptive insurance practices. The insur-
ance company, however, entered into a consent order under which all policyholders were
given the option of a refund or policy conversion. Nursing Home Insurance: Exploiting
Fear for Profit?, Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Health and Long-Term Care
and the Subcommittee on Housing and Consumer Interests, 100th Congress, 1st Sess. 58-
78 (statement and exhibits submitted by Michael Hatch, Commissioner of Minnesota
Department of Commerce) [hereinafter Joint Hearing].
120. NAIC MODEL AcT § 4(E)(4).
121. Id. § 5.
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renewal for stated reasons other than deterioration of health.
"Guaranteed renewable" provisions prohibit the insurer's declina-
tion of renewal for any reason, but permit premiums to be revised
on a class basis. "Noncancellable" provisions both ensure renewal
and prohibit the insurer's raising the premium.
1 22
The NAIC Model Act adopts the recommendation of the
NAIC, allowing insurers to renew long-term care insurance condi-
tionally, and to decline renewal for reasons other than the age or
deterioration of the mental or physical health of the insured.
23
The Model Regulations provide, however, that if a policy is repre-
sented as "guaranteed renewable" or "noncancellable," the terms
must be explained in the outline of coverage that insurers must
provide at the time of initial solicitation. 124 Insurers may request
the state's insurance commissioner to authorize nonrenewal on a
statewide basis if renewal would jeopardize the insurer's solvency,
or if the loss experience of the insurer warrants nonrenewal. 2"
The Congressional Task Force On Long-Term Health Care Poli-
cies concluded that the NAIC Model Act provision concerning re-
newal is inadequate because it may lead to nonrenewal when
policyholders are no longer able to buy another policy.126 Accord-
ing to the HIAA, all the policies introduced in 1988 that it ex-
amined were guaranteed renewable; 127 many policies introduced
prior to 1988, however, still are conditionally renewable or option-
ally renewable. 128 Clients should be advised of the insurer's rights
to cancel or raise premiums under such renewal provisions.
Some long-term care policies currently are being offered as
group insurance, either through employers or associations. The
Model Regulations provide that such group insurance must pro-
vide a covered individual with a basis for continuation or conver-
sion of coverage when employment is terminated or if the group
insurance is canceled. 2
9
122. NAIC REPORT, supra note 21, at 23.
123. NAIC MODEL ACT § 6(B)(1). The Illinois legislation contains an identical pro-
vision. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73 para. 963A-4(l) (Supp. 1989).
124. NAIC MODEL REGS. § 6(A); NAIC MODEL ACT § 6(G).
125. NAIC MODEL REGS. § 6(A)(1)(a), (b).
126. LONG-TERM HEALTH CARE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 25, at 35-36.
Most companies do not offer insurance to persons over the age of 79. HIAA RESEARCH
BULLETIN, supra note 23, at 13. A few companies, including Aetna Life & Casualty,
American Republic Insurance Company, and Medico Life will write coverage to age 84.
Bingham, supra note 88, at 13.
127. HIAA RESEARCH BULLETIN, supra note 23, Summary.
128. Id. at 12; see also Who Can Afford A Nursing Home?, supra note 87, at 302.
129. NAIC MODEL REGS. § 6(D).
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c. Policy exclusions
i. Preexisting Conditions
Under the NAIC Model Act, if an insurer limits coverage for a
preexisting condition, it cannot define "preexisting condition more
restrictively than as: ... a condition for which medical advice or
treatment was recommended by, or received from a provider of
health care services, within 6 months preceding the effective date of
coverage of an insured person."'' 30 Moreover, an insurer may not
use a waiver or rider to limit or reduce benefits for a specific preex-
isting condition beyond the six-month waiting period.' 3 '
The Model Act previously contained a definition of preexisting
condition that included an "ordinarily prudent person" standard
as well as the subjective standard of actual diagnosis and treat-
ment. 32 Many of the states that have adopted some form of the
Model Act, including Illinois, still include this standard to describe
a preexisting condition. 3 3 This definition of preexisting condition -
is more restrictive than the current NAIC Model Act definition. It
therefore provides more discretion to an insurer to deny benefits
for undiagnosed illnesses and may require more judicial interven-
tion to define the parameters of the "ordinarily prudent person"
test. Other states provide the same restrictive definition as Illinois
and also extend the waiting period before paying benefits for a pre-
existing condition. 34  These longer waiting periods were sanc-
tioned by the 1986 draft of the Model Act. 35  However, the
current six-month waiting period contained in the NAIC Model
130. NAIC MODEL ACT § 6(C)(1). This provision does not apply to group policies.
Id.
131. NAIC MODEL AcT § 6(C)(4). According to the Task Force on Long-Term
Health Care Policies, this provision may present problems for Continuing Care Retire-
ment Communities to the extent they fall within the scope of the Act, because CCRCs
typically restrict coverage for pre-existing conditions or require an additional fee. See
LONG-TERM HEALTH CARE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 25, at 61.
132. See NAIC MODEL INSURANCE LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND GUIDELINES (Oct.
1986); NAIC REPORT, supra note 21, at app. M.
133. For example, Illinois defines "preexisting condition" as:
the existence of symptoms which would cause an ordinarily prudent person to
seek diagnosis, care or treatment, or a condition for which medical advice or
treatment was recommended by, or received from a provider of health care
services, within 6 months preceding the effective date of coverage for an insured
person.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 963A-5(a) (1989). See also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-34.2-6(c)
(1989).
134. The waiting period is extended to 12 months for people above 65 years of age
and 24 months for persons younger than 65. See e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-12-10(a)
(West Supp. 1990).
135. See supra note 130.
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Act treats all insureds equally and also provides increased
coverage.
ii. Mental or nervous disorders
Like health and life policies, long-term care policies may contain
explicit provisions excluding certain conditions from coverage.1 36
The most controversial exclusionary provision in long-term care
policies is the exclusion for nervous and mental disorders, particu-
larly care for Alzheimer's disease, an organic brain disorder 3 af-
flicting an estimated 2.5 million elderly persons in 1985.138
Perhaps as many as 50% of nursing home residents may have the
disease. 39 A definitive diagnosis of Alzheimer's, however, can be
made only by brain biopsy or autopsy.140
The policy exclusion for mental and nervous disorders must be
read very carefully, because vague policy language creates an ambi-
guity about coverage for Alzheimer's disease. Some policies ex-
pressly exclude all "mental and nervous disorders," leaving no
doubt that Alzheimer's is not covered.1 4' Others explicitly cover
mental and nervous disorders with a demonstrable organic
cause, 42 while other policies expressly cover Alzheimer's dis-
ease.143 The NAIC Model Regulations currently prohibit an exclu-
sion or limitation of benefits for Alzheimer's disease." This
regulation alleviates many of the ambiguities created by the policy
provisions. Nevertheless, because the Model Act does not specify
which criteria are necessary, it is prudent to determine which in-
formation is required by the individual insurer to demonstrate that
an insured has Alzheimer's disease.
d. Benefit eligibility and limitations
i. Definitions of levels of care and providers of services
The benefit and access structure of a long-term care insurance
136. Typical exclusions include losses resulting from war, intentionally self-inflicted
injury or attempted suicide, services for which the insured was not charged, alcohol- or
drug-related diseases, and treatment delivered outside the United States. See GAO RE-
PORT, supra note 22, at 3 1.
137. THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 1337 (15th Ed. 1987).
138. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 31.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See J. FIRMAN, W. WEISSERT & P. WILSON, supra note 87, at 27-28.
144. NAIC MODEL REGS. § 6(B)(2). Minnesota has a similar prohibition in its stat-
ute. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62A.48 (Supp. 1990).
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policy should be reasonably clear in defining the level of care that
is covered by the policy.'45 Levels of care and service definitions
for long-term care policies, however, frequently fail the "reason-
able clear" test. The variations in the types of care covered by
long-term care policies and the manner in which these levels of
care are defined make it almost impossible to comparison shop and
evaluate the protection afforded by the policy.
Long-term care policies basically cover skilled and intermediate
nursing care,"4 custodial care and home care, although not with
any degree of uniformity. The NAIC defines four basic levels of
care offered by long-term care insurers:
1. "Skilled nursing home care": nursing and rehabilitative serv-
ices given by skilled medical personnel on a daily basis under
the orders of a physician.
2. "Intermediate nursing home care": skilled nursing care pro-
vided on an occasional basis.
3. "Custodial nursing home care" or "personal care": assistance
in requirements of daily living such as eating and bathing,
which can be provided by persons without medical skills.
4. "Home care": a variety of services provided in the home, in-
cluding skilled nursing care; speech, physical or occupational
therapy; and social work, personal care, homemaker and
choreworker services.147
The NAIC Model Regulations, however, do not define these levels
of care. Rather, they simply provide that skilled nursing care, in-
termediate care, personal care, home care, and other services "shall
be defined in relation to the level of skill required, the nature of the
care and the setting in which care must be delivered."1 41
Similarly, providers of services, such as skilled nursing facilities
and home care agencies, also must be defined "in relation to the
services and facilities required to be available and the licensure or
degree of status of those providing or supervising the services. "149
Insurers may require that the provider be licensed or certified.'°
The HIAA survey found that all policies covered nursing home
care that took place in facilities meeting state licensure require-
145. LONG-TERM HEALTH CARE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 25, app. at 147-
49.
146. The new quality of care survey laws for Medicaid have phased out the distinc-
tion between skilled nursing facilities and intermediate care facilities. Pub. L. No. 100-
360, § 411(1), 102 Stat. 800-804 (1988). All will be referred to as "nursing facilities."
147. NAIC REPORT, supra note 21, at app. F.
148. NAIC MODEL REGS. § 5(E).
149. Id. § 5(F).
150. Id.
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ments for skilled and intermediate care facilities.' 5'
Most state regulations defining skilled nursing facilities and in-
termediate care facilities are inextricably tied to the Medicaid reim-
bursement requirements. However, unlike Medicaid, most private,
long-term care policies pay a daily indemnity benefit for a stated
period of time, regardless of the services provided to the insured.
Accordingly, level of care distinctions based on the type of covered
services and the time of coverage make sense in a long-term care
policy only if they are used to determine eligibility for benefits and
not the amount of payment.' 52
Some state laws, however, are not as dependent upon Medicaid
definitions, such as licensing and certification laws addressed pri-
marily to quality assurance. To avoid consumer confusion, state
legislators should consider prohibiting insurers from using a partic-
ular designation to describe a facility or provider, unless the defini-
tion contained in the policy conforms to the applicable state law.
Then, insurers that define covered facilities and services more re-
strictively than state law could be required to disclose that fact or
use a different designation to describe the facility or service.
For example, the Illinois Nursing Home Care Reform Act de-
fines a "long-term care facility" as a private home, institution,
building, residence, or any other place that provides personal care,
sheltered care or nursing for three or more persons not related to
the provider. 5 3 The Act also defines "personal care," and "shel-
tered care."' 54 Under this proposal, an Illinois insurer could use
these terms to define covered services only if the covered services
matched the state law definitions. 5
ii. Levels of care offered: conditioning eligibility on prior
hospitalization or prior stay in skilled nursing facilities
The variation in benefits packages offered by insurers is the pri-
mary source of confusion among consumers and regulators of the
industry, and it is beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate the
151. HIAA RESEARCH BULLETIN, supra note 23, at 9.
152. LONG-TERM HEALTH CARE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 25, app. at 147-
49.
153. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, paras. 4151-101 etseq. (Supp. 1989).
154. Id. paras. 4151-120, 4151-124.
155. "Home health services" are defined under the Illinois Home Health Agency Li-
censing Act as "services provided to a person at his residence according to a plan of
treatment for illness or infirmity prescribed by a physician" and including intermittent
nursing services and services such as physical therapy, occupational therapy, speech ther-
apy, medical social services, or services provided by a home health aide. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 111 1/2, para. 2802.5 (1988).
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many different options.'56 However, several insurance policy pro-
visions restrict access to care and may have the adverse effect of
reducing the insured's chances of collecting benefits. 157
Most policies still require at least three days of hospitalization
for eligibility for benefits and also require a skilled nursing home
stay before paying benefits for lower levels of institutional or
noninstitutional care. '5  The NAIC Model Act currently recom-
mends prohibition of prior hospitalization or prior institutionaliza-
tion requirements. The Act provides, alternatively, that policies
that condition eligibility for benefits upon prior hospitalization for
the same or related conditions must allow a period of at least thirty
days from discharge for entry into a covered facility. 59 This rec-
ommended change in the Model Act reflects the finding that at
least 54% of all nursing home admissions do not occur after a
prior hospitalization.160 Similarly, the Model Act suggests another
provision that would prohibit sale of an insurance policy that con-
ditions eligibility for home health benefits on any prior institution-
alization requirement.' 6' The Illinois legislation does not include
these prohibitions, but other states have amended their legislation
to incorporate the change recommended in the Model Act. 62
156. Such evaluations are found in the surveys referred to supra at note 87.
157. See generally, J. FIRMAN, W. WEISSERT & P. WILSON, supra note 87. The au-
thors evaluated 77 plans offered by 29 companies as of July 1988 to determine the
probability of collecting benefits, the total benefits paid for an extended nursing home
stay, and the comprehensiveness of home care coverage. The authors then examined the
restrictions found in most of the policies, including prior hospitalization requirements;
requirements that insured receive skilled level care prior to receiving benefits for lower
level care; waiting periods; and requirements for home health benefits. The authors de-
vised probability estimates based upon the combined effect of the above restrictions, and
found that the average probability of collecting benefits was 6% if the insured was admit-
ted to a nursing home and not collecting benefits from any of the long-term care policies
surveyed. Because most of the plans that cover Alzheimer's disease also had prior hospi-
talization requirements or required skilled nursing care prior to coverage for lower levels
of care, most of the period of illness for Alzheimer's would not be covered. The authors
also estimated that a $50 per day indemnity plan is grossly inadequate to meet long-term
care costs because two-thirds of the policies did not offer benefits that adjusted for infla-
tion. Finally, the authors found that because there were severe restrictions on home
health benefits, for example, prior hospitalization or confinement in a nursing home, or
certification by a physician that the insured otherwise would need nursing home care,
there was only a small likelihood of receiving home health benefits.
158. See HIAA RESEARCH BULLETIN, supra note 23, at 10.
159. NAIC MODEL AcT § 6(D)(3). The Catastrophic Coverage Act would have
eliminated the three-day prior hospitalization requirement for SNF benefits. See Pub. L.
No 100-360, § 102, 102 Stat. 684-87 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395(d) (West
1989)), supra note 9.
160. See J. FIRMAN, W. WEISSERT & P. WILSON, supra note 87, at 42.
161. NAIC MODEL ACT § 6(D)(1).
162. Illinois law provides only that policies that condition eligibility for benefits upon
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Policies that do not require prior hospitalization or institutional-
ization may instead require a physician's certification of need.1 63
Some innovative policies, however, are moving away from medical
underwriting criteria to determine eligibility for benefits. 16" In-
stead, insurers are using criteria based on ADLs to measure disa-
bility. 65 Although using such criteria rather than a prior
hospitalization requirement may provide the insured with benefits
for more services, the policy should be evaluated carefully to assure
that the criteria are clear and definite and do not permit arbitrary
decisionmaking by the insurer.
For example, in a policy that currently is being offered by one
insurer, the insured would have to pass an "Activities of Daily Liv-
ing Test" to become eligible for benefits.' 66 An insured is eligible
for adult day care services if unable to perform one or more ADLs
(defined in the policy as transferring, walking, eating, dressing,
toileting and bathing) without the assistance of another person. 67
Benefits for all other covered services (i.e. nursing home, hospice
care, home health, or home hospice care) are available only if the
insured is unable to perform two or more ADLs without assistance
from another person. 6  The policy specifically requires that all
services be prescribed by a physician, but it is not clear if the physi-
cian must be an agent of the insurer or even whether the physician,
as opposed to another health care technician, certifies that the in-
sured meets the ADL tests. If the professional who performs the
test is an agent of the insurer, he or she may tend to decide close
cases in favor of the insurer. 69 Further, it is unclear precisely how
it is determined that the insured is "unable to perform" an ADL.
For example, although the ADL test may appear to be independ-
ent of medical criteria of need such as a prior hospitalization re-
quirement, such medical criteria nevertheless may be incorporated
prior hospitalization must allow a period of at least 30 days from discharge for entry into
a covered facility. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 963A-6 (1987). See, e.g., KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 40-2228(f) (Supp. 1989).
163. HIAA RESEARCH BULLETIN, supra note 23, at 10.
164. Wallack, Recent Trends in Financing Long Term Care, HEALTH CARE FIN.
REV., 97, 99-100 (Supp. 1988); HIAA RESEARCH BULLETIN, supra note 23, at 10. How-
ever, medical underwriting still is used to evaluate applications for long-term care
insurance.
165. Id.
166. Mutual of Omaha, "Long-Term Care Plus" Specimen Policy dated January
1989. This policy currently is offered for sale in Illinois.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. LONG-TERM HEALTH CARE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 25, app. at 151.
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into the determination that the insured is unable to perform an
ADL.
iii. Home care benefits
The NAIC has enacted amendments to the Model Regulations
that provide minimum standards for long-term care policies that
contain home care benefits.17 0 "Home care benefits" are not health
care services. Rather, they are defined as personal care services,
respite care, and other nonmedical services to assist the insured in
the activities of daily living. 71 The Model Regulations currently
do not regulate eligibility criteria for home care benefits. An ear-
lier proposed amendment, however, would have permitted an in-
surer to determine eligibility for home care benefits by requiring a
home care treatment plan. The plan could be prescribed by a phy-
sician or developed by assessing the insured's ability to perform
ADLs as part of a case management program, but "only if the in-
surer has reasonable review standards which it applies consist-
ently. ' 172 Those standards may not require the insured to be
unable to perform more than two ADLs to qualify for home care
benefits.' 7 The proposed amendment also would prohibit limita-
tions of home care benefits such as requirement of prior hospitali-
zation or confinement in a skilled nursing home, payment only for
services that are medically necessary or provided only by licensed
health care professionals, or limitation of benefits to home care
services only when the insured would otherwise need skilled care in
a skilled nursing facility. 74 These restrictions are common in the
long-term care policies currently being offered for sale.175
iv. Comparison of benefits for all levels of care
Once a policy's covered services are determined, it is still neces-
sary to compare the amount of benefits paid for each level of care.
The NAIC Model Act mandates that a long-term care policy can-
not provide coverage only for skilled nursing care nor can it pro-
vide "significantly more coverage for skilled care in a facility than
coverage for lower level care.'1 7 6 The Act, however, does not de-
fine the phrase "significantly more coverage," and the surveys of
170. See NAIC MODEL REGULATIONS (Jan. 1990).
171. Id. § 5(B).
172. NAIC Memorandum of Carol Olson, supra note 117.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See surveys referenced supra note 87.
176. NAIC MODEL ACT § 6(B)(3).
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long-term care policies reveal wide variations in benefits for lower
levels of care. 7 7 For example, the policy may indemnify home
health care services at a rate equal to less than 50% of the indem-
nity rate for nursing home care; it may include lower indemnity
rates for intermediate or custodial care; it may limit the number of
days for lower levels of care; or it may provide lower maximum
benefits for lower level care.17 1
Accordingly, the regulation should be more specific. One state,
Tennessee, specifies that determining whether a policy is providing
"significantly more coverage" for skilled care shall be based on the
aggregate days of care for lower levels compared to days covered
for skilled care.17 9 Even this method, however, does not provide
any specific guidelines as to what constitutes "significantly more
coverage." For example, if a policy provides 365 days of skilled
nursing home benefits, but only 150 days of benefits for other levels
of care, does the policy meet the legislative standard? In the ab-
sence of explicit regulations, the state department of insurance may
provide detailed information as to how they evaluate policies for
compliance with this performance standard.
v. Waiting periods
The purpose of the NAIC Model Act is to provide minimum
performance standards, not to standardize long-term care insur-
ance. Accordingly, it does little to regulate the deductible period,
which is usually defined in long-term care policies in terms of time
and commonly is called a "waiting period." In fact, the Model Act
prohibits insurers only from establishing a new waiting period if
existing coverage is converted to or replaced by other insurance
with the company. 18 0
As with other provisions in long-term care policies, those con-
cerning waiting periods vary greatly. 8 ' As a general rule, how-
ever, the longer the waiting period, the lower the premium. 18 2
Many policies permit the consumer to select a waiting period of 0-
100 days; some policies offer waiting periods of six months or one
year; and others offer "first-dollar" coverage with no waiting pe-
riod.I8 3 Although it is a matter of personal preference whether first
177. See supra note 87.
178. See supra note 158.
179. TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-42-105(b)(3) (Supp. 1988).
180. NAIC MODEL ACT § 6(B)(2).
181. See surveys cited supra note 87.
182. See, e.g., A. RIVLIN & J. WEINER, supra note 6, ch. 4.
183. HIAA RESEARCH BULLETIN, supra note 23, at 11-12.
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dollar coverage is desirable, the waiting period requirement should
be compared to the maximum benefit provisions of the policy. For
example, a policy with no waiting period may pay benefits for only
the minimum period prescribed by law (twelve consecutive months
under the Model Act);184 a policy with a longer waiting period may
provide more benefits over time.
e. Loss ratios
In measuring the relative value of health insurance, regulators
typically have used a "loss ratio" to assure that benefits are reason-
able in relation to premiums charged. 185 The loss ratio essentially
compares total claims and expenses with premiums collected.' 86
Long-term care insurance loss ratios, however, are difficult to
estimate because there is little actuarial data available and there is
a long period of time between purchase of the policy and antici-
pated collection of benefits. 87 Nevertheless, the NAIC Model Act
authorizes the Commissioner of Insurance to establish loss ratio
standards for long-term care insurance. 88 The Model Regulations
consider benefits under individual long-term care insurance poli-
cies reasonable in relation to premiums if the expected loss ratio is
at least 60%.189 However, in calculating loss ratios, long-term care
insurers are permitted to include a number of factors traditionally
not allowed in calculating such rates to provide insurers with "suf-
ficient latitude to achieve the sixty percent loss ratio.'" 'I
Federal law currently requires a loss ratio of 60% for Medigap
policies. 191 However, a federal government study found that 64%
of Medigap policies marketed in 1984 had loss ratios lower than
the 60% target rate. 192 In light of the latitude given to insurers
under the Model Act in estimating insurance loss ratios, and the
findings concerning Medigap loss ratios, a potential consumer of
184. NAIC MODEL AcT § 4(A).
185. LONG-TERM HEALTH CARE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 25, at 36-37 and
app. at 249-50.
186. Id. Loss ratios are calculated by dividing the sum of incurred claims, reserves
for future claims, and expenses by the amount of earned premiums.
187. Id. See also NAIC REPORT, supra note 21, at 26-27; G. SHEARER, supra note
44, at 27-28.
188. NAIC MODEL ACT § 6(E).
189. NAIC MODEL REGS. § 14.
190. Id. § 14 and Drafting Note to § 14.
191. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ss(c) (Supp. 1989).
192. Medigap Insurance: Law Has Increased Protection Against Substandard and
Overpriced Policies at 30, U.S. GEN'L ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIR-
MAN OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE, HOUSE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING, (October 1987).
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long-term care insurance should ask the insurer for specific infor-
mation about its estimated loss ratios.
2. Standards for the Form and Content of Long-term Care
Insurance Policies
The NAIC Model Act not only provides minimum standards of
coverage, it also regulates the form and content of long-term care
policies. Individual purchasers of such insurance must be given a
"free look" and have the right to return the policy within ten days
of its delivery if not satisfied for any reason (thirty days if the pol-
icy was issued pursuant to a direct response solicitation).' 93 The
first page of the policy must include a prominent notice informing
the purchaser of this right. 194
In addition, a purchaser must receive an "outline of coverage" at
the time of initial solicitation on a form prescribed by the insurance
commissioner. The outline must include a description of the prin-
cipal benefits and coverage; principal exclusions, reductions, or
limitations; terms of renewal and cancellation, premium revision
and premium refunds; and a brief description of the relationship of
cost of care to benefits. 95 The Model Regulations include the stan-
dard form prescribed by the NAIC. 96
These standards are more consumer-oriented than the perform-
ance standards discussed in the previous section. The outline of
coverage can be a useful tool for comparing policies. However, the
elderly client should be advised not to rely solely upon the outline.
Rather, the client should request a specimen policy from the insur-
ance agent or company. Although the NAIC Model Act does not
require the insurer or its agent to provide a specimen policy, re-
fusal to provide a specimen could indicate that the outline of cover-
age does not disclose all the salient features of the policy.
193. NAIC MODEL ACT § 6(F).
194. Id.
195. Id. § 6(G).
196. There are several options currently offered in long-term care policies that are not
discussed in this Article, but which may provide the client with added protection, most
notably, provisions adjusting benefits for inflation and waiving payment of premiums af-
ter the policyholder starts collecting benefits. For more information about these provi-
sions, see HIAA RESEARCH BULLETIN, supra note 23. In addition, there are several
pamphlets containing basic information about long-term care insurance that will provide
the elderly client with a good starting point to evaluate policy options. See, e.g., HIAA,
THE CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO LONG TERM CARE INSURANCE, and UNITED SENIORS
HEALTH COOPERATIVE, LONG-TERM CARE: A DOLLAR AND SENSE GUIDE (1988).
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E. Other Legislative Approaches
Other state legislative approaches to long-term care insurance
generally fall within two categories: (1) regulation of performance
standards that differ from the NAIC Model Act; and (2) incentives
to promote the sale of long-term care insurance.
1. Regulatory Efforts
The most notable departures from the minimum standards ap-
proach of the NAIC Model Act are the state programs that require
at least partial "standardization" of the long-term care insurance
market by uniform definitions for key policy terms and restricting
variations in policy provisions.1 97 Such legislation has been criti-
cized by the NAIC as "misguided" and "restrictive."' 1
Minnesota has standardized the long-term care insurance that
can be offered for sale in the state.199 It establishes two types of
policies, designated "A" and "AA," that differ in level of benefits
and other key provisions. 200 Both "A" and "AA" policies must
include the following provisions:
1. Preexisting conditions must be covered during the first six
months of coverage if the condition insured was not diagnosed
or treated during the ninety days immediately preceding the
effective date of coverage;
2. The maximum allowable waiting period is ninety days;
3. The policy cannot exclude coverage for mental or nervous dis-
orders with a demonstrable organic cause, such as
Alzheimer's disease;
4. The policy must be guaranteed renewable;
5. The policyholder can elect to have premiums paid in full at
age 65 by payment of higher premiums up to age sixty-five;
6. Premiums must be waived while benefits are being paid for
nursing home confinement;
7. The policy must include a thirty-day free look period;
8. If home care services must begin within a specified period af-
ter discharge from a hospital or nursing facility, that period
may be no less than thirty days; and20
9. Home care benefits must cover at least seven paid visits per
week. 202
197. See G. SHEARER, supra note 44, at 32-39 (arguing for standardization of the
market as a way to improve the market).
198. NAIC REPORT, supra note 21, at 28 and app. H at 145, 147.
199. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62A.46 (West 1986 and Supp. 1989).
200. Id. § 62A.48.
201. Id. § 62A.48(1).
202. Id. § 62A.48(2).
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Type "AA" policies must provide a maximum lifetime benefit of
$100,000.203 Nursing home and home care coverage cannot be
subject to separate lifetime maximums and only a one-day prior
hospitalization requirement can be imposed for long-term care in a
nursing facility. 2°4 If benefits are paid on a per diem basis, the min-
imum daily benefit for care in a nursing facility must be $60 or
actual charges and the minimum daily benefit for home care must
be $25 or actual charges.2 °5
Type "A" policies must provide a lifetime maximum benefit of
$50,000, and a requirement of prior hospitalization for up to three
days may be imposed for nursing facility or home care benefits.2°
The minimum daily benefit for nursing facility care is $40 or actual
charges and the minimum daily benefit for home care is $25 or
actual charges. 207 As of 1987, four private companies and Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota filed policies with the Minne-
sota Department of Insurance that meet the type A requirements.
Interestingly, the premium schedules for those policies were lower
than the policies previously being offered in Minnesota by the same
four private companies.20 8
Kentucky takes a different approach. The Kentucky law man-
dates that all insurers issuing individual health insurance policies
in the state on an expense-incurred basis develop a health policy to
provide benefits for services in a licensed long-term health facil-
ity.2°9 These policies must satisfy the following standards:
1. Benefits must be payable upon certification by an attending
physician that long-term care is required;
2. The policy must contain the same coinsurance and deductible
provisions as other services covered by these insurers;
3. The policy must include a deductible clause (waiting period)
of sixty days from the date of admission to the facility;
4. The policy must provide complete coverage on an expense-
incurred basis and pay at least 75% of the total cost of cov-
ered long-term care;
5. Insurers must offer nonduplicative coverage for Medicare
beneficiaries;
6. The policy cannot condition admission to an intermediate care
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See Joint Hearing, supra note 119, at 60-61 (statement of Michael Hatch, Com-
missioner of Minnesota Department of Commerce).
209. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17-314 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988).
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facility upon prior hospitalization or prior confinement in a
skilled nursing facility; and
7. The policy must provide coverage for skilled, intermediate,
and custodial care. 1°
A law mandating all individual health insurers to provide a long-
term care policy seems misguided because it forces companies that
otherwise would not enter the market to sell such policies, and
therefore increases the chance that premiums will be higher to off-
set the unwanted risk. New York has similar laws requiring health
insurers to offer optional home health coverage, hospice services,
and nursing home care.21'
Standardization of long-term care policies does deserve closer
scrutiny, however. The principal advantage of standardization is
that consumers will be better able to understand the choices in the
marketplace. 2 Massachusetts instituted a standardization pro-
gram for Medigap policies in 1980 that established three levels of
coverage.21 3 The program apparently achieved its goals of reduc-
ing consumer confusion and ensuring comprehensive Medigap cov-
erage. The Commissioner of Insurance received fewer than one
hundred complaints about Medigap policies in 1985, and the Mas-
sachusetts Medigap policies have been rated as the best in the
country. 214 Massachusetts recently announced a quasi-standardi-
zation approach for the long-term care insurance market similar to
its Medigap program. 5
2. Incentives to Buy and Sell Long-Term Care Insurance
a. Tax incentives
Colorado was the first state to allow a state tax deduction for
amounts up to $2,000 per year, deposited in an "individual medical
account," which can be withdrawn without penalty only to pay
medical, dental, and long-term care expenses of the account-
holder.21 6 Some states are considering legislation that would pro-
vide similar deductions, 7 or deductions or tax credits for the
purchase of long-term care insurance premiums. 218 Other states,
210. Id.
211. N.Y. INS. LAW § 1117 (McKinney 1990).
212. See G. SHEARER, supra note 44, at 12.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 211, § 65.00 (1988).
216. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-22-504.6 (Supp. 1988).
217. Ohio,.H.B. 558 (1987).
218. California, S.B. 658, A.B. 159, A.B. 1227 (1988); New York, A.B. 6306 (1988).
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however, have defeated similar legislative proposals.219 Some
states have provided incentives to purchase long-term care cover-
age by linking the coverage with public financing programs.
b. Public/private financing "partnerships"
South Carolina law allows any premiums paid for long-term care
insurance to be excluded in determining the amount an individual
must contribute to the cost of Medicaid services. 220 Indiana has
established a long-term care program under which a Medicare ben-
eficiary can become eligible to receive Medicaid benefits for long-
term costs not covered by Medicare or private insurance without
spending down her assets. To qualify, the recipient must purchase
a Medicare supplement policy or enroll in a prepaid health plan,
and purchase a qualified long-term care policy or enroll in a pre-
paid plan for long-term care services.22'
Several states are participating in the "Program to Promote
Long-Term Care Insurance for the Elderly" sponsored by the Rob-
ert Wood Johnson Foundation.222 The program is intended to
evaluate the potential of private market products in states that are
willing to expand the private role in public financing of long-term
care. 223 Massachusetts is using its grant from the Foundation to
subsidize the purchase of private insurance by low-income per-
sons. 224 Furthermore, if a Massachusetts consumer purchases a
policy providing at least three years of coverage, the consumer will
not be required to spend down assets to qualify for Medicaid when
the insurance coverage ends.225 Wisconsin, another Foundation
grant recipient, is considering a similar program that permits a
waiver of the Medicaid "spend-down" provision to a person who
purchases a qualified policy that meets or exceeds standards more
stringent than the NAIC Model laws.226
219. Arizona (bill permitting tax deduction for purchase of premiums); Hawaii (bill
providing tax credit for premiums); Idaho (bill providing tax deduction for premiums).
220. S.C CODE REGS. 38-72-100 (1989).
221. IND. CODE ANN. § 12-1-25-7 (West Supp. 1989).
222. The participating states are California, Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Wisconsin. See G. SHEARER, supra note 44, at 89-
92; Meiners, Reforming Long Term Care Financing Through Insurance, 6 HEALTH CARE
FIN. REV. 109, 111-12 (Supp. 1988).
223. G. SHEARER, supra note 44, at 89-92; Meiners, supra note 221, at 111-12.
224. G. SHEARER, supra note 44, at 89-90.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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c. Alternative financing mechanisms
Approximately 75% of all elderly own their homes, with an av-
erage home equity value of $54,000.227 Home equity conversions
allow elderly homeowners to borrow funds based upon the equity
value of their homes.228 The most popular type of conversion is the
reverse annuity mortgage, in which loan proceeds are paid by lend-
ers on a monthly or other periodic basis to the mortgagor and re-
payment is deferred for the term of the loan.229 Proceeds of the
mortgage can be used to pay long-term care expenses, including
the purchase of long-term care insurance.23 ° Various federal and
state agencies have implemented quasi-public home equity conver-
sion programs for the elderly.23I This option should be closely ex-
plored as a means to finance the purchase of long-term care
insurance.
IV. FEDERAL PROPOSALS TO REGULATE LONG-TERM
CARE INSURANCE
The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act did not provide bene-
fits for long-term care, but its enactment spawned an increased
awareness of the need for a federal response to the growing long-
term care crisis.232 The members of the 100th and 101st Con-
gresses introduced over twenty bills concerning long-term care.233
There is, however, no clear, bipartisan consensus on how to resolve
the problem of financing long-term care. Generally, the proposed
legislation concerning long-term care insurance falls into three cat-
egories: federal consumer protection legislation, federal tax incen-
tives, and universal social insurance programs to meet the long-
term care needs of the elderly and disabled. Although in his presi-
dential campaign, George Bush stated that he was committed to
"putting a long-term care law on the books quickly, ' 234 he also has
stated that the need for long-term care primarily is a family is-
227. See generally A. RiVLIN & J. WEINER, supra note 6, ch. 8; Weinrobe, Home
Equity Conversion and the Financing of Long Term Care, 6 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV.
113 (Supp. 1988); Jacobs & Weissart, Using Home Equity to Finance Long-Term Care, 12
J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L., 77 (Spring 1987).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. A. RIVLIN & J. WEINER, supra note 6, at 123.
231. See Weinrobe, supra note 227, for a discussion of these programs.
232. See. e.g., Lawmakers Taking Hard Look at Problem of Long-Term Care, 46
CONG. Q. 938, 940 (1988).
233. This Article will address only the proposals pending in the 101st Congress, some
of which have been reintroduced from the 100th Congress.
234. See The Candidates Speak Out, MODERN MATURITY, Oct.-Nov. 1988 at 38.
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sue. 235 As president, Bush has backed away from his "read my
lips-no new taxes" position, but has asserted repeatedly that he
will not impose new taxes to pay for social programs. Accord-
ingly, because a universal social insurance program for long-term
care cannot be financed by increasing tax revenues, it is reasonable
to assume that, at least initially, President Bush will support only
legislation encouraging personal responsibility for financing long-
term care.
A. Proposals for a Federal Long-Term Care Insurance
Consumer Protection Act
As of April 1989, three bills were introduced in Congress236 to
provide for the application of minimum standards to long-term
care insurance. Two bills were introduced in the House of Repre-
sentatives,s237 and one bill has been introduced in the Senate.238
Both Democrats and Republicans supported these proposals. Both
bills propose to create a program of voluntary certification of long-
term care insurance policies that meet minimum standards and
specified requirements. Under each proposal, a "Long-Term Care
Insurance Panel" would review policies submitted for certification
to assure compliance with the standards established in the legisla-
tion.239 The Secretary of Health and Human Services (or the Sec-
retary's designee) would certify qualified policies, which then could
be held out to the general public as having been authorized by the
Secretary." ° The bills carry a criminal penalty for misrepresenting
that a policy is certified or advertising, soliciting, or offering for
sale via the mail any long-term care policy that has not been ap-
235. Id.
236. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396 (West 1983 and Supp. 1988).
237. H.R. 1288, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 1325, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989). H.R. 1288 would amend the Public Health Service Act. The bill has been re-
ferred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. H.R. 1325, sponsored by
Rep. Pete Stark (D-Cal.), would amend Title XVIII of the Social Security Act (Medi-
care). The bill has been referred to the House Ways and Means Committtee and the
House Energy and Commerce Committee.
238. S. 142, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). S. 142, The Long-Term Care Protection
Act of 1989, would amend Title XVIII of the Social Security Act (Medicare). The bill
was cosponsored by Senators Cohen (R-Me.), Kassebaum (R-Kan.), McCain (R-Ariz.),
and Bradley (D-N.J.).
239. H.R. 1288 § 2615(b)(2); H.R. 1325 § 1882A(b)(2); S. 142 § 1882A(2)(A).
Under each proposed program, the Panel would consist of the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (or his designee), state insurance commissioners (or superintendents,
where applicable), individual Medicare beneficiaries, and representatives of employers
and labor. Only the Senate bill's Panel would also include a representative of the insur-
ance industry. S. 142 § 1882A(2)(A).
240. H.R. 1288 § 2615(c); H.R. 1325 § 1882a(c); S. 142 § 1882(c).
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proved by the state into which it is mailed.24'
Each bill contains a definition of qualified "long-term care insur-
ance" policy. The House bills incorporate the NAIC Model Act
definition,242 but the policy must offer coverage for at least twenty-
four months regardless of the type of facility or level of care.243
One of the bills-H.R. 1325-applies to "extended care insurance
policies," defined as policies that would otherwise qualify as long-
term care policies but only provide coverage for six to twenty-four
months.244 The bill, however, does not require insurers to label or
otherwise differentiate between such policies.
Under the provisions of each bill, the Secretary may certify poli-
cies only if they meet certain minimum standards, but the stan-
dards vary among the different proposals. All the proposals,
however, incorporate certain provisions of the NAIC Model Act
and Regulations, include a thirty-day "free look," and require poli-
cies to contain a statement (to be developed by the Secretary)
describing the benefits and limitations under the legislation. 245
Each bill also contains a provision under which policies are
deemed to meet the federal standards if they are issued in a state
with a regulatory program that is at least as stringent as the NAIC
Model Act, meets the other legislative requirements, and applies
the standards equally to all long-term care policies. 2 "
The origin of these bills is not hard to trace. They are all pat-
terned after the "Baucus Amendment" to the Medicare laws,
which establishes a voluntary certification program for Medicare
supplement insurance policies.247 Under the Baucus Amendment,
however, it is a felony to knowingly sell a health insurance policy
that duplicates Medicare benefits. 248 The bills proposing a federal
241. Violation would be punishable by a maximum sentence of five years imprison-
ment, a fine of $25,000, or both. H.R. 1288, § 2615(d); H.R. 1325 § 1882A(d); S. 142
§ 1882A(d).
242. NAIC MODEL AcT § 4(A).
243. H.R. 1288 § 2615(e)(1); H.R. 1325 § 1882A(f)(1). The Senate proposal con-
tains a definition of long-term care insurance that requires only twelve months of consec-
utive coverage like the NAIC Model Act.
244. H.R. 1325 § 1882A(f)(2).
245. H.R. 1288 § 2615(c); H.R. 1325 § 1882A(c); S. 142 § 1882A(c). H.R. 1288 and
H.R. 1325 also prohibit prior hospitalization requirements and provisions that condition
eligibility for benefits for lower levels of care on a prior nursing home stay; and they
provide that an insurer must offer at least one policy providing benefits for home- and
community-based services. Id. S. 142 requires policies to be guaranteed renewable at the
same premium rate. Id.
246. H.R. 1288, § 2615(b)(1); H.R. 1325, § 1882A(b)(l); S. 142 § 1882A(b)(l).
247. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ss (West 1983 and Supp. 1989).
248. Id. § 1395ss(d)(3).
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consumer protection program do not similarly prohibit duplicative
coverage. Senator David Durenberger (R-Minn.) proposed an
amendment to the pending bill to clarify that it applies to duplica-
tion of benefits furnished by a skilled nursing facility or home
health agency,249 but the proposed amendment did not specify
whether a long-term care policy is a "health insurance policy" as
the term is used in the Baucus Amendment. 250 Applying the pro-
hibition against duplication of benefits to long-term care policies
would not only equalize the treatment of Medigap and long-term
care policies under federal laws, but it also would prohibit long-
term care insurers from purporting to cover treatment of an acute
illness already covered by Medicare. Furthermore, it would have
the beneficial effect of focusing the attention of long-term care in-
surers on the long-term care needs of the chronically ill.
The Baucus Amendment was precipitated by the actual and per-
ceived sales and marketing abuses concerning Medigap policies. 251
Although not as publicized, there have been similar abuses re-
ported about the sale and marketing of long-term care insurance.252
Most of the complaints result from agents' poor understanding of
the products they are offering, or "switching" or "twisting" prac-
tices in which the agent convinces the elderly client to drop his
present insurance and buy a new policy. There have been serious
abuses reported.253
The proposed legislation to create a federal certification program
would not completely deter such sales and marketing abuses in the
long-term care insurance market. The national certification pro-
249. S. 142 § 3.
250. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ss (West 1983 and Supp. 1989).
251. NURSING HOME INSURANCE, supra note 13.
252. Id. at 8-17; see also, JoINT HEARING, supra note 119, at 37-48 (statement of
John Gilmore, independent insurance agent); id. at 56-78 (Michael Hatch, Commissioner
of the Minnesota Department of Commerce).
253. The MediCo Life Investigation in Minnesota offered over 4,000 policies (which
met the minimum requirements of state law) to the elderly in Minnesota and then in-
formed them that they had to join a federation to purchase the policies. The federation
was exempt from complying with the applicable Minnesota standards for long-term care
insurance. The agents misrepresented the benefits of the policy, and 95% of the purchas-
ers believed that they had purchased a comprehensive policy when in reality their custo-
dial benefits were limited to $2 per day. See JOINT HEARING, supra note 119, at 56-78
(statement and exhibits of Michael Hatch, Commissioner of Minnesota Department of
Insurance). In another "overselling" case one agent sold an elderly couple in California
21 long-term care policies representing $19,000 in premiums. Not one policy covered
custodial care. See id. at 79 (statement of Bonnie Burns). [Note: The Illinois Depart-
ment of Insurance has not taken any formal action against long-term care insurers. Tele-
phone interview with Mark Fulzinga, Evaluation Unit, Illinois Department of Insurance
(April 26, 1989)].
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gram for Medigap policies, however, has curbed sales and market-
ing abuses without stifling the supply side of the market." 4 There
is no reason to believe such a program would not have the same
positive effect on the long-term care market and help eliminate
substandard products.2 5  As of 1986, no Medigap policies had
been federally certified. 25 6 A long-term care insurance certification
program likewise could become a "paper tiger" if the industry per-
ceives the federal law as too restrictive.
Proposals for a federal certification program have been criticized
because they would increase "twisting" practices, because agents
could convince the elderly that their existing policies should be re-
placed by certified policies. The insured may then be subject to
new waiting periods, preexisting condition restrictions and, per-
haps, higher premiums. 7
B. Tax Incentives
It is beyond the subject matter of this Article to examine the
proposals for federal tax incentives in taking personal responsibil-
ity for one's long-term care and for universal social insurance pro-
grams. Both types of proposals, however, will affect the regulation
of private, long-term care insurance. The proposals for federal tax
incentives vary.258 All of them, however, essentially are intended
254. GAO REPORT, supra note 22.
255. Ohio law specifically provides that a violation of its Long-Term Care Insurance
Act (patterned after the NAIC MODEL AcT) is an unfair and deceptive insurance prac-
tice, subjecting the violator to a fine of $1,000. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3923.48-.99
(Anderson 1989). Rhode Island law permits the Director of Insurance to levy adminis-
trative penalties of $500 to $50,000 for violations of its long-term care insurance provi-
sion. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-34.2-10(C) (1989).
256. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 10.
257. G. SHEARER, supra note 44, at 86-87.
258. Congressman Matthew Rinaldo (Rep.-N.J.) introduced legislation during the
1st Session of the 100th Congress proposing amendments to the Internal Revenue Code,
U.S.C. title 26, to exclude from gross income benefits received under long-term care poli-
cies that are certified by the Secretary; employer contributions for such insurance;
amounts withdrawn from individual retirement accounts to purchase certified policies;
and amounts received on cancellation or surrender of life insurance contracts and used to
purchase certified long-term care policies. H.R. 3501, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
Other proposals include S. 139, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (exclusion from gross in-
come for withdrawals from individual retirement accounts to pay long-term care insur-
ance premiums); S. 140, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (tax credit); S. 141, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989) (tax credit for premiums); H.R. 338, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (deduction
for contribution to long-term care savings accounts); H.R. 421, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989) (tax benefit for insurers offering long-term care policies); and H.R. 688, §§ 101,
102, 103, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (exclusion of long-term care benefits from gross
income; exclusion from gross income for withdrawals from individual retirement ac-
counts to pay long-term care insurance premiums). For further discussion of this issue,
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to promote consumption of private, long-term care insurance and
to encourage personal responsibility for long-term care planning by
private risk-pooling via long-term care insurance.259 In addition,
by providing incentives only for "qualified" long-term care insur-
ance policies, the legislative proposals dictate consumer protection
policy concerning acceptable products.
There have been no published projections about the cost in tax
dollars arising from such proposals. These proposals, however,
should not be evaluated without reference to a broader public pol-
icy issue: whether long-term care financing should be privately or
publicly supported. The subtle objective of the proposals for indi-
vidual tax incentives is to delay or prevent the enactment of legisla-
tion creating a social insurance program for long-term care. The
value of these tax incentives for low- and middle-income taxpayers
is questionable, however. Even with the tax incentives, private,
long-term care insurance may be too expensive for such
taxpayers.260
C. Proposals for a Universal Social Insurance Program for
Long-Term Care
Although the use of private, long-term care insurance has in-
creased substantially since 1980,261 it is not likely to become the
primary mechanism for financing long-term care. A recent study
estimated that, even assuming the most favorable conditions (e.g.,
low premiums and purchase of policies at age sixty-five), a third of
the elderly population in the years 2016-2020 will not be able to
afford private, long-term care insurance.262 If more realistic pre-
mium levels are considered, the number of elderly unable to afford
such insurance rises to almost 50%.263
Recent surveys suggest that a majority of voting-age adults favor
see NAIC REPORT, supra note 21, app. K. Rep. Rinaldo's proposals as well as other
proposals introduced in the 100th Congress to provide federal tax incentives for long-
term care planning are discussed in Moran & Weingart, Long-Term Care Financing
Through Federal Tax Incentives, 6 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 117 (Supp. 1988).
259. Moran & Weingart, supra note 258, at 117-18.
260. See LONG-TERM HEALTH CARE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 25, app. at
178-87.
261. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
262. A. RIVLIN & J. WEINER, supra note 6, ch. 4. J. FIRMAN, W. WEISSERT & P.
WILSON, supra note 87, at 43, estimate that a policy with no prior hospitalization or prior
skilled care requirements that paid a daily benefit of $80 per day (adjusted for inflation),
with a waiting period of 90 days and a 4-year maximum benefit period, would have an
annual premium of $2,000 to $2,500 for persons age 65, and premiums of $7,000 to
$8,500 for persons age 80.
263. A. RIVLIN & J. WEINER, supra note 6, ch. 4.
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some form of government insurance for long-term care.211 Ap-
proximately 75% favor government assistance for long-term care
insurance. 65 Thirty-five percent of the voters surveyed favored a
universal government assistance program, while 60% preferred a
program focusing only on the most needy.266 Despite these statis-
tics, at least one-third of the people surveyed who favor an expan-
sive federal program do not want to pay more taxes to finance such
programs.2 67 All in all, however, nearly 50% of those surveyed
rate long-term care for the elderly and disabled as an important
public concern.268
Armed with this public "mandate," the dismal statistics on the
spiraling costs-of long-term care, and the elderly's concomitant in-
ability to pay those costs, several Democratic legislators in the
health care political arena have proposed social insurance pro-
grams, which are estimated to cost from $8 billion to $55 billion.269
All proposed programs would be financed through tax increases of
one form or another, including payroll taxes, gift and estate taxes,
alcohol and gasoline taxes, income taxes, premium increases for
Medicare, or a combination of the above. Some of the proposals
expand the Medicare program to include long-term care, while
others propose the creation of a freestanding program.2 7
It is not the purpose of this Article to analyze thoroughly the
public policy implications of these legislative proposals. 2  The
crucial inquiry is whether the market for private, long-term care
insurance will be eliminated or altered by them. If after their en-
actment there is still a need for private insurance, the issue be-
comes whether it should be federally regulated. Under most of the
proposals, there still will be a market for private insurance,
although not for the same type of product that has been discussed
264. See, e.g., HIAA RESEARCH BULLETIN, Public Attitudes on Long-Term Care
(March 1989).
265. Id. at 17.
266. Id. at 18.
267. Id. at 20.
268. Id. at 4-5.
269. G. SHEARER, supra note 44, at app. B (outlining the key provisions of the vari-
ous legislative proposals).
270. Id. at 40-43, Table VII-1 and app. B.
271. The key proposals from the 100th and 101st Congress include S. 2305, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); S. 2681, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); H.R. 200, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1989); H.R. 1325, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); H.R. 3436, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1988).
272. For a discussion of these programs, see G. SHEARER, supra note 44, ch. 9; A.
RIVLIN & J. WEINER, supra note 6, chs. 10-17.
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in this Article. For example, H.R. 3436273 covers only home
health care and will reimburse providers only for charges up to
75% of the Medicare SNF benefit rate. Because Medicare cata-
strophic coverage pays benefits for only 150 days of SNF care, the
Medicare-eligible elderly still would be uninsured for extended
stays in a skilled nursing facility and for all stays in other types of
facilities. Accordingly, a private market could develop for "nurs-
ing home insurance," rather than long-term care insurance, as that
term has been used here.274
The private, long-term care insurance market also would be af-
fected by the proposals that contain waiting periods before covered
persons become eligible for federal benefits, or require copayments.
For example, H.R. 1325 requires a three-month waiting period
before receipt of benefits for nursing home care. S. 2305 requires an
even longer waiting period, two years, before receipt of benefits for
nursing home care.27 5 With the exception of H.R. 3436, these pro-
posals require a copayment, although the amount varies from 5%
to 50% depending upon the type of service. These provisions most
likely will create a market for "gap" long-term care insurance simi-
lar to the Medigap policies. Indeed, for the proposals that expand
the Medicare program rather than create an independent program,
the private, long-term care insurance market could be displaced by
an expanded Medigap insurance market. The legislation therefore
should contain provisions to ensure that private insurance does not
duplicate federal benefits, similar to the current law concerning
Medigap insurance.27 6
The federal proposals for a long-term care social insurance pro-
gram also might have the affect of altering how the private market
assesses the need for long-term care. The proposals contain eligi-
bility criteria based upon the ability to perform activities of daily
living. The more innovative policies on the market are using this
type of evaluation, but many state laws still permit prior hospitali-
zation requirements. 27 " Federal legislation using ADL criteria to
determine eligibility, however, may provide a standard against
273. See supra note 271.
274. See supra note 107 and accompanying text for further reference to "nursing
home insurance."
275. Sen. Mitchell stated that he intended for the private market to develop afforda-
ble insurance to fill the gap. See Mitchell Offers Long Term Bill, 46 CONG. Q. 1084
(1988).
276. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ss(d)(3)(A) (West 1983 and Supp. 1989).
277. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (discussing prior hospitalization
requirement).
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which the private market can be measured. It may also encourage
state legislators to require policies sold in their respective states to
use similar eligibility criteria.
None of the proposals contain provisions to regulate the private,
long-term care industry. Accordingly, legislation such as the pro-
posals mentioned above still would be necessary to set minimum
standards or to establish a federal certification process for private,
long-term care insurance. An alternative would be to enact legisla-
tion and regulations that establish standards for private, long-term
care gap policies and permit companies to bid competitively for the
right to market such insurance.278
V. CONCLUSION
Planning for the financing of long-term care through private,
long-term care insurance may be affected by any of the current
legislative proposals for long-term care. Federal legislators are
poised to address these proposals, but it is unclear whether any of
the current proposals will be enacted. For the moment, then, pri-
vate, long-term care insurance is the most viable option for per-
sonal planning for long-term care.
The insurance industry faces a formidable challenge, however, in
designing long-term care insurance policies that are comprehen-
sive, that meet the minimum performance standards required by
state law, and that remain affordable. The products currently be-
ing offered often fail to meet these goals. Accordingly, policies
must be thoroughly evaluated to assure compliance with applicable
law and comprehensiveness of coverage.
278. See G. SHEARER, supra note 44, at 48.
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